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Abstract
The emergence of platforms is shifting the locus
of digital innovation to ecosystems on which
numerous developers create extensions with
additional functionalities. Despite all the potential
benefits for complementors, however, this new
organizing logic of digital innovation also introduced
essential new risks. Recent studies in IS focused on
risk of IT projects from a contingency perspective
neglecting the complexity of ecosystems. In order to
shed light on this, our work examines how app
architecture as a complementor´s control mechanism
and four types of ecosystem hazards shape the
likelihood and impact of the risk of failure in thirdparty innovation. By using a configurational
approach based on fuzzy-set qualitative comparative
analysis (FsQCA), we display complex interactional
effects of the causal conditions on complementors’
perception of hazardous environments and thus
provide valuable insights for both practice and
theory on platform ecosystems.

1. Introduction
Pervasive digital technology significantly changes
the logic of innovation. One of the most important
aspects of organizing such innovation processes is
shifting the locus of innovation on technological
platforms [46, 59]. A digital platform, i.e. an
extensible code base, allows the development of
complementary
products
or
services
(e.g.
applications) that augment a platform’s native
functionality [50]. Companies offering such
complementary
applications
are
called
complementors or third-party developers [18]. To
accelerate innovation on digital platforms, platform
owners have to create and sustain vibrant ecosystems
of third-party developers [9]. Modular platform
architecture enables complementors to develop their
own apps independently, yet platform interfaces
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ensure their interoperability. This tendency towards a
disintegrated architecture is mirrored by an
increasing degree of interorganizational modularity,
distributing the partitioning of innovation among
many heterogeneous firms [5].
Digital technology therefore creates several
idiosyncrasies in the organizational logic of
innovation [50]. First, the loosely coupled
relationships between actors like the platform owner
and single third-party developers represent a hybrid
form of organizations which exhibits characteristics
of both markets and formal alliances in the traditional
sense of economic exchange theories [49]. Second,
following this logic, control and knowledge is
distributed between various actors [50]. Finally, such
relations are frequently characterized by coopetition
(i.e. simultaneous cooperation and competition). For
instance, although platform owners encourage the
development of third-party innovations, they might
compete with complementors in certain market
niches [12].
Although organizing digital innovation around a
technological platform has created new business
opportunities by providing complementary resources,
it also introduced essential new risks. We refer to this
phenomenon as risk of third-party innovation. In
comparison to traditional risks of software
engineering [7, 48], the locus of this form of risk is
not within the own organizational boundaries but on
platforms as well as within the focal complementor’s
relationship multiple and heterogeneous actors.
Exogenous and relation-specific factors like for
instance opportunistic behavior of the platform
owner, market related factors as well technological
dependencies on the platform, thus constitute crucial
threats which lay outside the direct control of a
complementor.
In order to theoretically explain the emergence of
software development risks and provide IS
management with means for its management,
previous research proposes that successful
organizations establish a fit between the degree of
uncertainty of their environment and their structural
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and control approaches [10]. This perspective
extensively examined the role and interplay of
control mechanism and environmental factors in
influencing the risk of IT projects [34, 37].
In the context of third-party development on
technological platforms, this perspective runs its
limits for two main reasons. First, the contingency
approach assuming the existence of a single state of
fitness between control mechanisms and potential
exogenous hazards is not able to capture the
increasing dynamics and complexity of an ecosystem
as the focus of IT innovation is shifting to platforms.
We therefore utilize configuration theory [33] as
theoretical lens to overcome the traditional
reductionism problem [27] and examine the
equifinality of different solutions for managing risk
in ecosystems where a different set of elements can
produce the same outcome.
Second, complementors are typically not able to
apply direct control mechanisms to govern thirdparty innovation in platform ecosystems for reducing
their risk. Congruent with previous work, which
highlights the role of modular architecture as a
control function for alliances [43] or to reduce
opportunistic behavior [20] we argue that the
modularization of application-platform linkages is the
useful mechanism for complementors to manage the
relation with the platform owner.
Addressing these two shortcomings of previous
research, the purpose of our work is therefore to shed
light on complementors’ third-party innovation risk
by explaining its prevalence based on different
configurations exogenous hazards from the platform
ecosystem as well as the microarchitecture of single
applications which may serve as a safeguard against
those hazards. We therefore address the following
research question: Which configurations of
architectural choices and ecosystem-related hazards
minimize the complementor´s risk of third-party
innovation?
To answer these questions, our research analyzes
data from a survey of 42 complementors on five
leading cloud platforms using fuzzy set Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (FsQCA) [33]. The FsQCA
approach is a case-oriented method that enables
analyzing asymmetric and complex causal effects by
extracting configurations that consistently lead to the
outcome of interest [14, 13].
Our study offers three noteworthy contributions.
First, it outlines the influence of environmental
hazards on the risk related to a major form of
organizing digital innovation, platform-based
application development. Second, it empirically
validates the inseparability of environmental
dynamics and architectural choices in such digital

innovation settings. Third, it offers insights on how
digital architecture can be utilized as a coordination
device
of
complementors
to
manage
interorganizational relations and to reduce risk.

2. Conceptual background
2.1. Risk of organizing third-party innovation
In IS research, risk represents a function of both
uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage, which
is experienced by a decision maker [26]. A further
crucial concept in this context is hazards, which is
defined as a source of danger [21]. Consequently, if
an actor is not able safeguard against such hazards,
they create a potential loss, i.e. risks.
Previous approaches examining risk in interorganizational arrangements like for instance R&D
alliances [e.g. 31] or IT outsourcing [e.g. 3] are
theoretically grounded in theories of economic
exchange (i.e. transaction cost theory [49]).
Following the logic stated in the introduction,
however, we argue that the specific characteristics of
digital technologies create also significant changes in
the nature and analysis of risk. The loosely coupled
relationships between the platform owner and a
complementor represent a hybrid between
characteristics of a market and an alliance. Therefore,
significantly new uncertainties evolve for the
participants of platform ecosystems. In particular, the
distribution of control and knowledge among
heterogeneous
actors
accelerates
uncertainty
regarding the technology itself or the behavior of the
alter [12, 50]. For instance, the platform owner´s
control over boundary resources (i.e. software
development kit (SDK) application programming
interfaces (APIs)) makes complementors increasingly
dependent [18]. This limits third-party developers’
space to control the exchange with the platform
owner itself. Furthermore, as this new organizing
logic of digital innovation frequently requires
coopetition (i.e. simultaneous cooperation and
competition) to drive innovation, complementors
may suffer from platform owners to adopt and
modify their applications in order to capture
attractive market niches [12]. While platform owners
encourage
the
development
of third-party
innovations, the loss of intellectual property is
therefore a common threat in this context [6].
The risk of third-party innovation as an outcome
variable is therefore defined as the potential failure of
the complementor´s innovation effort in a loosely
coupled and coopetitive relationship with the
platform owner. This concept has two distinctive sub
dimensions [31]: risk likelihood (i.e. the probability
that the digital innovation effort will fail) and risk
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impact (i.e. the perceived possible loss in the form of
missing or underachieving the goals of the innovation
effort). While the first sub dimension is mainly
resulting from uncertainty, the latter is accelerated by
the specificity of a digital platform and the resulting
migration costs to another technology.

2.2. A configurational perspective
organizing digital innovation

on

In IS, researchers adopt a contingency approach
risk management to examine the role and interplay of
control mechanism and environmental factors in
influencing the risk of IT projects [35, 38]. This
approach has been strongly influenced by research in
organizational contingency theory, which proposes
that successful organizations ensure a unifinality of
fit between the degree of uncertainty of their
environment and their structures [11]. Rather than
assuming the existence of best-fitting combinations
of predictor variables, we assume equifinality of
different configuration of variables Thereby, we take
a holistic viewpoint which abstains from evaluating
net effects of single variables but treats such
configurations in a whole as explanatory factors for
the outcome of interest. Such an application of
configurational theory in the context of digital
innovation in platform ecosystems is suitable for two
reasons.
First, in configurational approaches whole sets of
elements serve to simultaneously explain the
outcomes of interest [13].
Because of that,
configurational theory is particularly appropriate to
explain synergetic and complementary causalities
[33]. This resonates well with current theoretical
perspectives on the organizing logic of digital
innovation in general and platform and ecosystem
management in specific. Research in this field
highlights the inseparability of ecosystem dynamics
from app architectures and their mutual effect on
innovation outcomes. Therefore, examining variable
in isolation therefore is no reasonable approach
towards explaining risk in third-party development.
On the other hand, recent organizational [14] and
information systems research [25] suggests that the
assumption of symmetric causal relationships might
not adequately display organizational realities [13].
In contrast, configurational theories imply
equifinality between different sets of initial
conditions [33] and assume asymmetric rather than
symmetric relations between conditional variables
and outcomes [13]. Consequently, corresponding
analysis procedures allow for the detection of
sufficient or necessary causes of a dependent
variable. For instance, while the existence of a

particular hazard might consistently lead to high risk
for complementors, this does not mean that its
absence will lead to low levels of risk (e.g., there
might be other hazards which substitute for it).
Considering these advantages of configurational
perspective,
we
argue
that
understanding
organizational outcomes of the distributed organizing
logic of digital innovation strongly depends on
configuration of several design choices with its
environment.

2.3. Research framework
Fig. 1 illustrates the framework of this article. We
divided the concept of third-party innovation risk into
two distinctive dimensions: risk likelihood (i.e. the
probability that the digital innovation effort will fail)
and risk impact (i.e. the perceived possible loss). The
framework comprises two facets of causal conditions
for risk. It proposes that from the perspective of
complementors, the configuration of four exogenous
hazards (i.e. platform specificity; behavioral, market
& technological uncertainty) and two endogenous
choices to manage their innovation effort (i.e. app
decoupling and standardization of interfaces)
influence the risk of third-party innovation.

Figure 1. Research framework
In the selection of our causal conditions, we
follow notions of Tiwana et al. [46] on intra-platform
dynamics and the required fit of architecture and
environmental dynamics to process strategic
outcomes. Our set of causal conditions therefore
includes design elements outside (hazards of the
ecosystem) as well as within (app decoupling and
standardized interfaces) the range of complementors’
influence and is theoretically guided by the
dimensions of transaction cost theory [49].
Platform specificity: The specificity of a certain
platform represents the first hazard for a
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complementor. Platform specificity refers to the
transferability of a complementor´s application to a
different platform [4] as well as the value of
complementor´s assets within alternative partner
relations [36]. For instance, platforms require
investments in relation-specific knowledge to
participate in the platform ecosystem and capitalize
from the access to complementary resources and
capabilities [3]. Specific assets can be for instance,
human assets, technological assets or knowledge
about platform architecture, interface specifications
and market characteristics. High levels of asset
specificity and the related investment requirements
create dependence between partners, lead to lock-in
effects which make it difficult for the complementors
and move to another platform [22]. A high specificity
of assets required for building complementary
products therefore results for instance in high multihoming costs [2]. Therefore the amount of a potential
loss is likely to be higher under conditions of high
platform specificity.
The second exogenous hazard for complementors
in platform ecosystems is uncertainty, which is most
commonly defined as the absence of complete
information about the contextual environment. This
in turn leads to an inability to predict it accurately
[29]. The concept of uncertainty is crucial in
organization theory and frequently applied in studies
on risk in IS [29]. For the purpose of our study we
define uncertainty rather on the interorganizational
environment than on the project level. On this level
we apply an environmental perspective on
uncertainty, which explains the unpredictability of
the firm's environment surrounding a relationship
between firms [16, 44].
Market uncertainty: Market conditions are crucial
drivers for the risk of complementors, as for instance
the sustainability of the specific niche is required to
succeed.
Volatile
customer
demand,
the
unpredictable emergence of new substitute products
or changes in the competitive environment might
increase the threat of failure during the development
of complementary products.
Technological
uncertainty:
Furthermore,
technological unpredictability covers the inability to
accurately forecast the technological requirements
within the relationship, which is especially important
in complementary platform markets. Technological
complexity and changes are the most significant
sources of uncertainty [29]. Technological
uncertainty is also frequently related to a lack of
experience with the technologies employed in the
ecosystem [30], which increases the threat of failure
due to inadequate capabilities. Furthermore, the
unpredictability of technological evolution might

constitute a source of risk during third-party
innovation [46].
Behavioral
uncertainty:
In
contrast
to
environmental uncertainty, which is not directly
related to the partner, behavioural uncertainty arises
from the complexity and difficulty of evaluating each
other’s actions within a relationship. Taken to the
platform context, the platform owner might follow its
individual interests and cause hidden costs by
inefficient and ineffective behavior [49]. Moreover,
although platform owners encourage the development
of complementary products to nurture the overall
value of the ecosystem [37], there is often a tension
between them and complementors. This tension
arises from the complementor´s threat of
opportunistic behavior of the platform owner by for
instance exploiting resources or competing in the
partner’s niche [22].
Building on Tiwana [46], who outlines the
required fit of application architecture and platform
dynamics we extend this line reasoning to the risk of
third-party innovation. Prior works highlight that the
role of modular architecture as control mechanism to
influence the outcome of interorganizational
arrangements [43] or to reduce opportunistic
behavior [20]. Therefore, third-party developers
possess design alternatives based on which they can
influence the governance of their relation to the
platform. Concretely, the microarchitecture (in
contrast to the macro-architecture of the overall
platform) of their apps allows complementors to
minimize risk by exploiting the benefits of
modularization [44, 45]. On the micro level of
application architecture, we focus on the
modularization of the app-platform linkages rather
than internal modular app architectures. App
modularization therefore minimizes the application–
platform dependencies on the degree to which an app
is required to be conforming to the specified interface
that is vice versa determined by the platform owner
[44, 45]. Hence, applications within the same
ecosystem can significantly vary in their level of
modularization [28] as its micro-architecture reflects
an endogenous choice of the complementor.
App Decoupling: Decoupling allows for changes
within a module which do not require parallel
changes in the platform and vice versa. App
decoupling reduces dependencies at the boundary
between app and platform and minimizes the
interactions between both [46]. Hence, the
technological volatility of a platform does not
necessarily require changes in the single application.
It enables the flexible and independent development
of apps. Third-party developers are therefore able to
adapt the application´s internal implementation
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without the need of knowledge about internal details
of the platform [39].
Standardized interfaces: Standardization refers to
the use of standards and protocols predefined by the
platform owner (e.g., platform specific APIs) that are
applied to meet conformance between the platform
and the complementor´s applications. Such standards
are introduced by a platform owner to manage the
relationships between the app and the platform.
Standardization reduces the need for iteration
between the complementor and the platform owner
and ensures interoperability between the platform and
the app. This underlines the role of standardized
interfaces as a control mechanism [44, 45].
Both mechanisms allow complementors to
developed
apps independently and ensure
interoperability with the platform and represent an
architectural control mechanism to manage their
innovation activities in the ecosystem.

3. Research methodology
3.1. Data collection and sample description
Our sample of firms 750 firms which are
members of five leading cloud platforms (i.e.
Microsoft Azure, Oracle Cloud Platform, Amazon
Web Services, SAP HANA, and Salesforce
Force.com). There were two reasons for choosing
these particular platforms. First, all platforms are
well-established and have solid traction among thirdparty developers. Second, in all five platforms, a high
level of power imbalance is prevalent, so that they
perfectly meet our requirements for analyzing
asymmetric third-party relationships.
Key informant data was collected via a web
crawling approach which randomly gathered contacts
from the platforms´ app stores. This approach is
consistent with previous surveys of third-party
developers [8]. The potential respondents were
contacted via an e-mail containing information on the
research project, a link to the online questionnaire as
well as the request to complete the survey or to
forward the questionnaire to other executives (Clevel; IT executives) as further potential key
informants [23].
In total, we obtained complete data on N=42
cases. This equals a response rate of 5.6 %, a
common value in such settings [e.g. 8]. We assessed
this possibility by comparing responses of early and
late respondents [2]. T-tests did not reveal any
significant differences (p > 0.05) rejecting the
presence of non-response bias in our dataset.
Complementors from all five platforms replied
(Microsoft Azure: 9; Oracle Cloud Platform: 4;
Amazon Web Services: 2; SAP HANA: 9; and
Salesforce Force.com: 14). Most of them were high-

level executives (C-level: 71.4 %; BU executives: 19
%) and indicated high experience in managing
platform-based software development (>10 years:
83.3 %).

3.2. Measurement validation
Based pilot study with managers in the software
industry, we constructed our measurement
instrument. In order to ensure validity, reliability as
well as rigor of our research [24], we adapted
existing scales to the platform context and refined
them based on the insights from the pilot study.
Subsequently, these refined items were evaluated in a
pre-test procedure. This helped us ascertaining that
the formulation of all items was unambiguous and
comprehensible.
Table 1 displays the psychometric statistics of the
measured constructs. There is strong evidence for
adequate reliability with Cronbach’s α greater than
.85 for all variables. Furthermore, we can assert
discriminant validity as confirmatory factor analysis
yielded adequately high factor loadings concerning
so that the Fornell/Larcker criterion is fulfilled for all
our study variables [13].
Table 1. Construct measures

To reject the possibility of common method bias,
we conducted Harman’s one-factor test [27]. The
unrotated factor solution resulted in 5 factors
explaining 77 % of the variance (35 % was the
largest variance explained by one factor). Hence,
common method bias is unlikely to be a problem.

3.3. Fuzzy-set QCA
We chose FsQCA as means to analyze the
obtained data. This set-theoretic approach is utmost
suitable to configurational theories as it aims at
extracting whole configurations rather than single
factors that help to explain outcomes of interest [14].
Thereby, FsQCA draws on set-based measures of
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consistency and coverage in order to evaluate the
predictive power of the potentially possible
conditional configurations. Consistency values
display to which degree cases that share a certain
combination of conditions also lead to a specific
outcome [33]. Hence, this indicator is analogous to
correlation estimates in statistical methods. The other
indicator of quality, coverage, represents the degree
to which a configuration covers the instances on
which a specific outcome is realized. Defined as
such, the meaning of coverage values resembles that
of R-square values in regression analysis. The
FsQCA procedure consists of three steps through
which consistent configurations are detected [33]:
calibration, construction of truth tables, truth table
analysis.
Calibration of construct measures is necessary
because FsQCA as a set-theoretic analysis approach
draws on membership scores (here, e.g. membership
in the group of firms with highly decoupled apps)
rather than values on interval or ratio scales. In our
study, we thus transformed the Likert scale measures
into fuzzy set membership scores. These range
between 0 and 1 with 0 indicating full nonmembership, 1 indicating full membership and 0.5
marking the crossover point [40]. We follow the
calibration approach outlined by Fiss [14] and chose
the observed maximum and minimum values within
the sample to specify full membership and full nonmembership for all variables. The median of
observed values served as cross-over point. Based on
these three values, the calibration procedure in the
FsQCA software program (version 2.5) [34]
transforms all obtained measures to membership
scores.
The second step of FsQCA is the construction and
refinement of a matrix of all possible configurations
of antecedent conditions (in our case a 64x6 matrix;
in general 2kxk, with k as the number of conditions
observed [33]). In order to fit the requirements of
FsQCA, this truth table must subsequently be refined.
This procedure evaluates each possible configuration
on the basis of two criteria: frequency and
consistency. The frequency assesses which of the
possible configurations actually appear in the dataset.
In Large samples, it is often reasonable to exclude
infrequent cases so that it is necessary to set a
frequency threshold for the inclusion of
configurations in the further analysis procedure. As
our sample is medium-sized in terms of FsQCA
literature, we chose the standard threshold of 1 which
is suitable for samples of this size [40]. The
consistency criterion captures if a truth table row
consistently yields an outcome. The consistency
value thereby should outreach at least .8 [33], so we

chose a rather conservative threshold of .9. Overall,
in 28 cases, configurations exceeded the frequency
threshold of which 13 also exceeded the consistency
threshold for risk likelihood and 17 for risk impact.
In the third step, the truth tables are analyzed via
counterfactual analysis. This approach is based on
Boolean algebra in general and applies the QuineMcCluskey algorithm in particular. This algorithm
strips away factors which are not consistently present
concerning a particular outcome [14] in order to
identify the conditions within a configuration which
cause the outcome. Hence, the algorithm excludes
conditions that are no essential part of a sufficient
configuration for the respective outcome and
produces two distinct solutions: the parsimonious
solution and the intermediate solution. The
parsimonious solution on the one hand draws on all
simplifying
assumptions
derived
from
counterfactuals. It passes a more thorough reduction
procedure, so that the data provides strong empirical
evidence for the causality of these conditions.
Therefore, the parsimonious solution encompasses
the causal core of conditional variables. In contrast,
the intermediate solution only includes simplifying
assumptions based on easy counterfactuals [33]. The
conditional variables which appear in the
intermediate solution but do not appear in the
parsimonious solution thus represent the causal
periphery of a configuration [14].

4. Results
The results of the FsQCA reveal several patterns
that explain how different configurations of app
architecture and environmental hazards result in high
or low levels of both risk likelihood and risk impact.
We extracted these patterns by comparing structures
of different configurations [14]. Figure 2-5 show the
configurations resulting from FsQCA. Black circles
indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out
circles indicate the absence of a condition, large
circles indicate core condition, and small circles
indicate peripheral conditions. Blank spaces indicate
a condition may be either present or absent.

4.1. Configurations
likelihood of risk

for

achieving

high

We identified seven different configurations that
result in a high likelihood of risk. Consistency for
configurations ranges from 0.90 to 0.99. Raw
coverage, which describes the importance of a certain
configuration in explaining the intended outcome,
range from 0.26 to 0.46. The overall solution
consistency shows these seven solutions can
consistently result in high likelihood of risk with 89
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%. The overall solution coverage indicates that the
extent to which these seven configurations cover high
likelihood of risk cases is 76 %. We compared the
seven configurations of our analysis to extract two
strong patterns:
I) In platform ecosystems with a high level of
market uncertainty complementors are very likely
to perceive a high likelihood of risk in third-party
innovation (2a&b; 3a&b), which can be explained
by the increased likelihood for market disruption
or instability of the complementor´s niche.
II) If the interfaces are not standardized and market
uncertainty is high (3a&b), especially with lack of
app decoupling as peripheral condition, the
likelihood of risk for complementors is high as
changing market conditions might increase the
need for adaptions in the application. However, if
apps are not modularized, complementors are not
able to improve the application fast and
independently. Therefore, lack of modularization
reduces the flexibility to react to changes within
the market environment.

IV)

is volatile. In particular, market uncertainty
(2a, b, c; 4a & b) and technological
uncertainty (1; 4a&b) are the main hazards to
result in a high impact of risk.
The interplay of high interface standardization
and low app decoupling (3) represents the
second pattern to create a high impact of risk.
This can be explained as high standardization
requires high investment of the complementor
to adhere platform-specific interface standards
while a lack of decoupling reduces flexibility
and increases the threat of cascading ripple
effects that might disrupt its interoperability
with the platform.

Figure 3. Configurations for high risk impact

4.3. Configurations for achieving low
likelihood of risk

Figure 2. Configurations for high risk
likelihood

4.2. Configurations for achieving high impact
of risk
Furthermore, we identified seven different
configurations that result in a high impact of risk that
exceed minimum consistency threshold. These seven
solutions consistently result in high risk impact with
89 % and cover 81 % of cases with this outcome.
Comparing the seven configurations reveals two
further important patterns:
III) The impact of complementor´s risk in thirdparty innovation is high when the environment

Figures 4 and 5 show the configurations for a low
level of risk. We compared these sets of causal
conditions with the configurations that lead to high
risk to detect relevant differences. Consequently, we
identified six configurations that result in a low
likelihood of risk. These solutions consistently result
in a low likelihood of risk with 91 % and cover 72 %
of cases with this outcome. Comparing the six sets of
causal conditions we extracted three further patterns:
V)
If behavioral uncertainty is missing,
complementors perceive a low likelihood of
risk (1a&b; 2a&b), although technological
uncertainty is high (1a&b). This shows that
complementors that are able to monitor the
behavior of the platform owner face a lower
likelihood of risk as they reduce the space for
opportunism.
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VI)

VII)

Configurations of market uncertainty in
presence with an absence of technological
uncertainty account for low risk likelihood
(3a&b) if the company does not draw on app
decoupling. This fact can be explained as
technological
stability
allows
the
complementor to reduce risk by offering
ability to react to changes in the market
quickly. Under these circumstances app
decoupling does not offer additional benefits.
Likelihood of third-party innovation risk is
low when interfaces are highly standardized
(2a&b), which reflects the role of interfaces to
standardize rules that apps ought to obey and
can expect the platform to obey. This
underlines the role of app architecture as a
control mechanism for risk.

IX)

resources that are idiosyncratic for this certain
platform or app migration to another platform
can be easily achieved.
If uncertainty in the ecosystem is low,
complementors face a low level of risk
impact. Especially, when behavioral and
technological uncertainty are missing (2; 4; 5).
This shows the interplay of a reduced space
for opportunism and the stability of the
platform in reducing risk.

Figure 5. Configurations for low risk impact

4.5. The drivers of risk and the role of app
architecture

Figure 4. Configurations for low risk likelihood

4.4. Configurations for low impact of risk
By analyzing cases for a low impact of risk, we
uncovered six different configurations that result in a
low impact of risk. These solutions consistently result
in that outcome with 90 % and cover 83 % of cases
with a low level of risk impact. By comparing these
configurations for low risk impact, we found two
final patterns:
VIII) Surprisingly, the specificity of a platform is
not a main driver of risk impact but its missing
predicts low impact of potential losses (1;
3a&b; 4). From this finding we can derive that
complementors do not perceive failure to have
a high impact on them when they did not
heavily invested in knowledge and other

From the nine pattern identified in the comparison
of configurations that lead to high and low risk, we
are able to reveal holistic insights of the drivers of
third-party innovation risk and the role of app
architecture as a control mechanism. Based on the
commonalities among the patterns, we identified
three holistic findings to explain the risk of thirdparty innovation and its management.
First, uncertainty of the platform owner´s
behavior as well as the specificity of a platform, are
no main drivers of complementor´s risk. Instead
configurations in which both are absent display a low
impact and likelihood of risk during digital
innovation. Hence, while environmental hazards are
needed to turn specific assets and opportunistic
partners into considerable drivers of risk, engaging
with reliable partners or acting on platform with low
asset specificity might at least partially mitigate the
impact of environmental hazards.
Second, market and technological uncertainty are
the main drivers of risk in digital innovation.
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Unstable market conditions and technological
volatility are crucially influencing the impact and
likelihood of risk during third-party innovation.
Third, application architecture represents not a
direct control mechanism to govern the platform
dependencies
during
digital
innovation.
Standardization of interfaces might rather represent a
necessary condition to achieve a low level of risk
under certain circumstances. Consequently, the use of
standardized interfaces is required to minimize risk.
However, if apps are highly modularized, this does
not necessarily imply low levels of risk but the effect
rather depends on the environment.

5. Conclusion
By comparing different configurations that result
in high and low risk, we identified nine patterns that
describe the role of environmental hazards and app
architecture in shaping risk. From these patterns we
derive the role of technological and market
uncertainty as core drivers of risk. Furthermore, our
findings reveal that behavioral uncertainty and
platform specificity are not drivers of risk per se.
However, their absence is required to achieve low
levels of risk. In addition, we detect the role of app
architecture as a control mechanism for third-party
innovation. As the absence of app modularity is
always implying a high level of risk, it is a necessary
condition for minimizing risk.
Therefore, the contribution of our study is
threefold. First, it contributes to research of risk in IS
by applying a configurational perspective on the new
organizing logic of digital innovation and providing
evidence for the equifinality of different paths in
reducing risk. Second, our research contributes to
past work on platform dynamics [46, 13] and intraplatform management [44, 45] by uncovering the
interplay of environmental factors and technological
architecture in achieving organizational outcomes.
Third, we contribute to previous studies on
modularization as control mechanism [43, 44, 45] by
revealing app modularization as necessary condition
to minimize risk.
From a practical point of view, our results show
that app developers should use app decoupling and
standardized interfaces to reduce risk particular in
uncertain environments. Further research in this
direction could possibly focus on the interplay of app
architecture and governance mechanism, which are
introduced by the platform owner, to provide an even
more holistic approach to the risk of third-party
innovation.
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